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Introduction and Background 
Algeria is the second largest country in Africa in terms of land mass and the first to 
have been colonised by a European power during the nineteenth century. It currently 
has close to 35 million inhabitants, mainly concentrated along towns and cities of the 
Mediterranen littoral. Over three quarters of Algerians are under the age of 30. Most 
of the population has Arabic as their first language, although a significant minority 
(about 20-25 per cent of  the population) is Berberophone or Amazigh, and French is 
widely spoken in urban areas. This reflects the rich legacy of successive invasions, 
originally by Arabs  (who conquered and converted local Berber populations from the 
dominant animism to Islam from the seventh century onwards); subsequently by 
Ottoman authorities (who established a garrison in Algiers and three regencies or 
beyliks with capitals in Médea, Constantine and Mascara lasting from the sixteenth to 
early nineteenth century); and finally, from 1830-1962 through its adminstrative 
incorporation into France and colonialisation by diverse European settlers. 
 
The one continuity throughout this thirteen-century history has been the presence of 
Islam as the dominant religion and civilizational referent. Although devout Algerians 
overhwelmingly follow Sunni Maliki rites, historically sufism has played a significant 
cultural and political role throughout the country. (There are also tiny remnants of  
Kharajite Shi’ite, Christian and Jewish populations). Logically enough, Islam has in 
the modern period been mobilised as a political and cultural resource against foreign 
invaders, but not always homogenously or consistently. Sufi-inspired, charismatic-
millennarian (‘maraboutic’) movements characterised resistance to both Ottoman rule 
and early French colonisation. But by the first decades of the twentieth century, the 
rise of mass political movements in Algeria swung the ideological pendulum toward 
secular nationalist, liberal, pan-Arab, socialist and even communist forces. Islamic 
reformism or Islamism was certainly influential politically and culturally throughout 
the colonial period, its principal expression being  the Association of Algerian 
Muslim Ulama founded in 1931 under the charismatic leadership of the religious 
notable Abdelhamid Ben Badis.This political strand, however, was only one – and 
arguably less prominent - of several interwar anti-colonial political forces. Ben 
Badis’association was fashioned as a self-consciously elitists organisation, explicitly 
eschweing political engagement at the time of its emergence, and instead directing its 
energies toward the ‘moral education’ of the country’s Muslims through a network of 
schools and religious clubs. The Association’s membership peaked at about two 
thousand and remained confined to the petit bourgeois and merchant classes, 
principally from the more conservative inland regions in the East of the country.  
 
With the rise of the French Popular Front in 1936, the Islamic refomists became more 
politicised, joining with Algerian communists and the integrationist Federation of 
Elected Natives (Féderation des Elus Indigènes) in convening a Muslim Congress 
aimed at securing full civil equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in Algeria. 
By the outbreak of World War II, this assimilationist stance was transformed into a 
more explicitly independentist position, articulated in Ben Badis’ iconic slogan ‘Islam 
is my religion, Arabic is my language and Algeria is my fatherland’. Yet the mass 
mobilisation for Algerian independence and its strategic direction was determined by 
the radical nationalists of Messali Hadj’s Algerian People’s Parrty (Parti du Peuple 
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Algerien, PPA) in combination with various smaller dissident liberal and leftist 
forces.The National Liberation Front (FLN) that subsequently led the anti-colonial 
struggle inherited this very broad and eclectic ideological mix, including among its 
cadres and discourse aspects of all the above political tendencies.  
 
Algeria’s revolutionary war of national liberation (1954-1962) delivered a twenty-
year experiment in state-planned development. Despite this, the post-colonial 
economy continued to be tightly linked to the former metropolitan centres: GDP 
growth – an average of 7.2 per cent between 1967 and 1978-  was strongly dependent 
on exports throughout these years (95 percent of the foreign currency earnings 
stemmed from hydrocarbons exports), while European partners to this day account for 
over two-thirds of Algeria’s foreign trade (France being the largest single partner) 
(Henry, 1996; Martín, 2003; Ruedy, 1992). The nationalisation in the 1970s of the 
strategic hydrocarbons sector did little to undermine the disproportionate reliance on 
international markets as a source of national income - most notably the energy 
markets, but also through the sizeable income generated through remittances from 
Algerian workers living abroad. Oil and gas today still constitute 90 per cent of 
Algeria’s export value. So long as the international energy prices remained high, such 
external dependence was able to fuel some degree of domestic industrialisation and 
democratic socio-economic infrastructure in education, health, transport and welfare. 
Once these prices plummeted in the 1980s and 90s, however, the country was forced 
to borrow from international financial institutions, raising the debt ratio to GDP and 
the debt service to crippling levels by the mid-1980s. 
 
With unexpected death of President Houari Boumediene in 1978, Algeria began a 
process of economic liberalisation under the new President Chadli Benjedid in the 
course of the 1980s, dropping much of the country’s revolutionary programme and 
socialist orientation, and initiating a timid process of political pluralisation. This was 
in part a response to the wider international context - involving the fall in oil and gas 
prices – and the beginnings of the neo-liberal ‘counter-revolution’ across the world. 
But it also corresponded to a deliberate strategy among the country’s elites – 
principally the Army General Staff – to selectively extend the reach of the private 
sector in the economy and de-centralise industry.  
 
Widespread rioting across Algeria in the autumn of 1988 spurred on this process, and 
in February 1989 a popular referendum approved the country’s new constitution 
which, among other state-society reforms, authorised the formation of independent 
associations ‘with a political character’ (Ruedy 1992). Thirty new political parties 
emerged in the following months and in June 1990 the country’s first freely contested 
local elections resulted in a resounding victory for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS in 
the French acronym). The Islamist ascendancy was confirmed in the first round of 
legislative elections in December 1991, where the FIS gained 44 per cent of the votes. 
Faced with the now unstoppable (and electorally-mandated) rise to power of the 
Islamists, the country’s military command, backed by secular political and social 
forces, cancelled the second and definitive round of legislative elections scheduled for 
January 1992. The Army declared a state of emergency, outlawed the FIS, 
incarcerated its leaders and followers, and established a military junta –the High 
Council of State – as the country’s new executive power.  
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For all its fragmentary political platform, the FIS managed during the brief period of 
‘opening’ (or infitah) to socially coalesce a generalised rejection of the Algerian state 
as it had evolved thirty years after liberation, replacing civic conceptions of the 
national solidarity with religious ones. As Hugh Roberts has suggested, the radical 
Islamists successfully targeted the Party-State’s legitimacy as rightful inheritor of the 
revolutionary war against French colonialism. ‘The avowed purpose of the FLN’, 
Roberts averred as early as 1988 ‘was the “restoration of the sovereign, democratic 
and social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles. Yet the state 
which the FLN established, the Democratic and Popular Algerian Republic, is most 
certainly not an Islamic state’.  Consequently, Roberts continues, ‘The question raised 
by the radical Islamist movement in Algeria is therefore this: what does it mean to 
speak of “the framework of Islamic principles”; if the state which claims to have been 
established within this framework does not embody or base itself upon these 
principles, is not an Islamic state? The Algerian government does not have a clear 
answer to this question’. (Roberts, 2003: 4 and 6. Italics in original). It was this 
frontal challenge to the State’s legitimacy - a removal of the Emperor’s clothes, so to 
speak - that focused the minds of the country’s elites and their supporters, and elicited 
a correspondingly radical reaction to the Islamist challenge. 
 
These series of events were the proximate cause of the violent conflict that raged 
between (and indeed among) Islamist insurgents and the State, as well as other 
Algerian social and political forces on both sides of the conflict, during the 1990s and 
shaped Algerian politics since then. There is no need to delve here into the detail of 
this protracted civil strife – its various phases, actors and turning points. Suffice is it 
to say that the conflict cost close to 200,000 lives (including the assassination of a 
Head of State), resulted in thousands of  ‘disappearances’ and gross violation of 
human rights by both state and insurgent forces, and has consequently directly 
affected the bulk of the Algerian population to one degree or another (Evans, 2007; 
Willis, 1999).  
 
The changing relationship of Algerian Islamism to the Algerian state will form one of 
the central articualting themes of the analysis that follows. It is the dialectical, almost 
(perversely) symbiotic relationship between the State and Islamist contestation in 
Algeria over the past two decades that will be empahsised here. The political 
economy of post-colonial Algeria has given state authority – particularly the Army 
and the nationalised hydrocarbon sector – a pronounced patrimonial/clientelist 
character which has in  turn shaped the form and content of IPD. The specific 
expression of such patrimonialism has certainly shifted over time: the revolutionary 
populism of the Boumediene years gave way to Chadli’s attempts at implementing a 
state-led neo-liberal revolution, which in turn has delivered a form of authoritarian 
market state over the past decade. Across each of these periods however, we find the 
valorisation of the Algerian state and its Army as the main or even sole source of 
legitimate authority, underwritten by these institutions’ origins in the foundational 
moment of the Algerian war of independence. For all the ideological and political 
permutations within the State and the Islamist opposition over the years, two bodies – 
the FLN and the National Liberation Army, ALN – remain the touchstones of 
nationalist ‘authenticity’ and therefore indispensable referents of political legitimacy. 
The historical memory of the war continues to play a pronounced role in Algerian 
public life, and the revolution won ‘by the people, for the people’ has been 
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appropriated in one of two ways, usefully identified by Omar Carlier as a ‘populism 
of contestation’ and a ‘populism of regulation’ (Carlier, 1995: 310). 
 
The rest if this chapter aims to probe the tension between these two manifestations of 
Algerian populism in explaining the fraught relationship between Islam and political 
dissent in that country. After a first section sketching the anatomy and development of 
contemporary Algerian Islamism, subsequent parts of the essay will focus on how the 
agenda of IPD in Algeria was shifted by President Bouteflika’s strategy of national 
reconciliation. What I call ‘Bouteflika’s gambit’ (and others have labelled the 
‘Bouteflika effect’) combined domestic reform and reconciliation with an 
international strategy of diplomatic recognition and economic integration into the 
world market.  As such, international and indeed transnational forces – from the 
Global War on Terror to the influence of regional politics and diasporic communities 
– should also be factored in as a signal influence on IPD in Algeria. 
 
Throughout the article I adopt a broadly materialist framework that sees IPD as an 
expression of concrete socio-economic and political crises, rather than some 
transcendental, cultural feature of Islam or so-called Muslim societies. I thereby aim 
to draw out some of the  similiarities between Algeria and other patrimonial post-
colonial states (most notably Egypt and Pakistan) whilst also highlighting the 
particularities of the country’s socio-economic and political make-up as a major 
hydrocarbons exporter and a regional diplomatic broker. These specific features will 
be considered in relation to Asef Bayat’s reflections on post-Islamism – how far 
Algeria’s recent history and its peculiar dynamics of IPD can be considered as an 
example of a polity that has moved beyond a political culture framed by the global 
Islamist resurgence of the past decades, and how indeed this may help to explain 
Algeria’s apparent immunity from the revolutionary changes taking place regionally 
as part of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’.    
 
An Anatomy of Dissent 
Commenting on the Chadli government’s reaction to the 1988 riots, Omar Carlier has 
suggested that it was almost as if the Islamist opposition was given the following 
injunction: ‘ We’ll leave you with the mosques and the town halls, you leave us with 
the market and the State’ (Carlier, 1996: 380). Although laced with some irony, this 
statement nonetheless offers a neat entry-point into one of the deeper continuities in 
the relationship between Islam and political dissent in Algeria. As already noted, 
Islam has been present in Algerian politics throughout the modern period, yet the 
form and force of this presence has varied considerably. Séverine Labat makes the 
point elegantly when she affirms that ‘The struggle for Algerian independence has in 
effect been organised around two axes, the one ‘cultural’, represented by the 
Association of Ulema, the other political, embodied in the PPA-MTLD, and 
subsequently the FLN.  In making Islam an expression of national unanimity, each of 
these two poles of Algerian nationalism simultaneously turned Islam and the Nation 
into the major issues in the quest for legitimacy by the different clans aspiring to 
exercise power’. (Labat, 1995: 59)  
 
This tension between Nation and Islam, or between civic and religious conceptions of 
nationalism, was initially resolved by the new Algerian Republic through a relegation 
of Islam to the cultural or spiritual sphere, broadly conceived. What remained of the 
Association of Ulemas had already been assimilated into FLN during the war, and 
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with independence much of their previous activity and concerns were now directed 
through the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Although all of the country’s post-colonial 
Constitutions have made reference to Algeria’s Arab-Muslim character, the 
substantive socio-economic and political implications of this affirmation have 
remained nebulous (beyond symbolic gestures like making Islam the religion of state 
and reserving the Office of President for Muslims only). If anything, it has been the 
absence of properly Islamic policies and orientations within Algerian government and 
society that has historically exercised Islamist political forces in the country. 
 
These were initially expressed through  al-Qiyam al-islamiyya (Islamic Values) – an 
association of former AUMA members, led by Hachemi Tedjini, who rejected 
integration into the FLN and became one of the early critics of Ben Bella’s ‘impious’ 
adoption of ‘foreign’ and ‘westernised’ ideas of  Marxism, socialism and autogestion. 
(Evans and Phillips, 1997;Labat, 1995; Roberts, 2003; Willis, 1996). Al-Qiyam’s 
influence  was chiefly denunciatory, focusing its energies –as the AUMA had done at 
its inception - on policing what it deemed to be immoral and un-Islamic public 
behaviour (consumption of alcohol, immodest dress, mingling of the sexes) as well as 
challenging the influence of secular, leftists ideas and culture through its own 
publications and religious activities. 
 
Such denunciations were opportunistically instrumentalised by Boudemdiene on 
deposing Ben Bella in June 1965. Although the dynamics of the coup responded to 
more deep-seated factional and personal antagonisms among the revolutionary 
leadership rather than to any fundamental dispute over the place of Islam in the new 
republic, Boumediene and his supporters were intent on ‘nationalising’ Islam. Instead, 
Boumediene’s incorporation of Islamic reformist such as Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi into 
cabinet as Minister of Education (and later, Minster of Information and Culture) 
together with his ‘Arabisation’ policy during the 1970s opened new avenues for the 
‘Islamisation’ of the public sphere, outside the Army and the State. It was during the 
Boumediene years that Islamist figures like Abbasi Madani and Sheikh Abdellatif 
Soltani - both leading lights in al-Qiyam, the former a future leader of the FIS – made 
inroads for their cause among university students, the urban slum-dwellers and 
disaffected civil servants (Willis, 1996). The contrasting conceptions of Islam and the 
Nation were increasingly, if very unequally, polarised between secular leftists 
supporters of Boumediene and his Islamist opponents – many of which had been 
inspired by the post-1967 ‘Qutbist’ turn in the Mashreq. The antagonism was played 
out –both physically and philosophically - in university campuses, in public spaces 
and in some workplaces. With the launch of an ‘Agrarian Revolution’ in 1971 aimed 
at, among other reforms, radically redistributing private land to local cooperatives and 
‘socialist villages, Boumediene took, for many of his Islamist critics, one leftist turn 
too far. Sheikh Soltani articulated this anti-leftist sentiment in his 1974 polemic 
‘Mazdaqism is the Is the Source of Socialism’ which famously argued that true 
Muslims should not pray on nationalised land (Evans & Phillips, 1997). Indeed for 
Evans and Phillips, ‘Boumediène’s leftward turn was a crystallizing moment. The 
roots of the Islamist movement which emerged in the 1980s are to be found in this 
episode. On the one hand it cemented the alliance with those groups most threatened 
by the Boumediène regime – large landowners, business interests, conservative 
elements of the state administration who provided the Islamists movement with 
important financial support. On the other hand Soltani’s arguments wielded enormous 
influence and came to form the basis of an all-encompassing critique of the   
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Boumediène regime. Anti-socialism and anti-communism, along with the call for 
government based upon the sharia, became the cornerstones of the Islamist lexicon.’ 
(Evans & Phillips, 1997: 93). It is to this new phase of Ilsam and political dissent that 
we now turn. 
 
In somewhat stylised form, we can identify three broad strands of dissident Islamic 
movements emerging from Algeria’s twenty years’ crisis after 1988. The first 
crystallised around what might be labelled ‘collaborative dissidents’ willing to 
compromise and work with the existing state power, not least since some of their 
cadres and leadership are former state functionaries. The harakat mutjama’ al-silm 
(Movement of Society for Peace, MSP), founded by Mahfoud Nahnah and two of its 
splinter parties, Ennahda (Renaissance Movement) now led by Lahbib Adami and 
Abdallah Djaballah’s harakat al-islah al-watani (National Reform Movement, MNR 
in its French acronym) all represent the more conservative, pious and 
acccommodationist wing of Algerian political Islam (See Boubekeur, 2007 for a good 
overview). They have all participated in elections, some have won representation in 
the Popular Assembly and the MSP has held several portfolios in successive cabinets 
since 1988.  
 
A second, more powerful expression of Islamism, which we may label ‘oppositional’ 
or ‘militant’ comes in the shape of the FIS. Uniquely among Islamist organisations 
(across the Arab world at least) the FIS is explicitly a ‘front’ in that it encompassed 
very different tendencies, from the pragmatic ‘technocratic-nationalist’ Jaz’airists (ie. 
Algerianists) to more ideological Salafists (in a historical, rather than contemporary 
sense) who adopted a pan-Islamic stance (Labat, 1996). The broad and under-
specified programme of the FIS was a deliberate ploy to tap into popular discontent 
with the ruling FLN and the state. Indeed the French pun that suggests the FIS is the 
‘child’ of the FLN (‘le FIS est le fils du FLN’) captures well the Islamists’ intention to 
take over the nationalist mantle from the ruling party.  
 
A final manifestation of Islamist political dissent is properly jihadist in that it adopted 
armed struggle (the ‘lesser jihad’) as its chief strategy of opposition. Although some 
have traced this form of dissent back to the warlordism and banditry of the Ottoman 
period, and subsequently to the anti-colonial resistance of the maquis, the explicitly 
jihadist movements only emerged over the past thirty years (Hafez, 2000; Martinez, 
1998; Layachi, 2004). The short-lived al-Haraka al-islamiyya al-musallaha (The 
Armed Islamic Movement) of the nineteenth-eighties gave way in subsequent decades 
to armed wing of the FIS, the al-Jaysh al-islami lil-inqadh (Islamic Army of 
Salvation, AIS in its French acronym) and the more radical al-Jama‘at al-islamiyya 
al-musallaha (Armed Islamic Group – GIA in French). The latter group in turn 
morphed into the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (al-Jamaa'atu l-Salafiyyatu 
li l-Da'wati wa l-Qitaa) and from Spring 2007 into al Qaeda in the Islamic Countries 
of the Maghreb (Tandhim Al Qaeda fil Maghreb al-Islami) (Steinberg and Werenfels, 
2007; Ashour, 2010). 
 
The ‘bloody decade’ of the 1990s caused significant economic disruption and market 
distortion for the everyday lives of Algerians as the ‘informal’ sector, fuelled by 
criminality, violence and cross border smuggling (trabendo, a shortened version of 
Spanish for ‘contraband’) coupled with official corruption deepened social 
inequalities, stunted growth and promoted inflation (Martinez 1998). By the end of 
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the 1990s, official unemployment in Algeria stood at 29 per cent, inflation at 20 
percent while the share of expenditure going to investment drooped to 28 percent of 
GDP (Hodd 2004: 42). It against this backdrop that we should then understand the 
Islamist resurgence of the last three decades as a ‘re-invention’ of populism. Algerian 
Islamists have drawn extensively from the imagery, language, programme, idiom, 
organisation and indeed cadres of the national liberation movements. The one crucial 
ingredient they have added to the populist legacy is the seeming incorruptibility and 
authenticity of ‘Islam’. Whilst the populism of the national liberation movements was 
institutionalised into state power- in the process acquiring all the secular, this-worldly 
trappings of such forms of political rule - Islamist populism allowed itself, in the 
main, to resist the world of ‘le pouvoir’ and instead built (and billed) itself as an 
opposition, grassroots movement guided by other-worldly piety. As the legitimacy of 
post-colonial states collapsed in tandem with that of secular Arab ideologies, the 
social base of such ‘populism of contestation’ remained relatively unaltered, drawn 
from a combination of urban under-employed university graduates, petit bourgeois 
traders and the lower echelons of state bureaucracy. But its ideological axis was re-
aligned toward the only worldview which remained seemingly untarnished: that of 
political Islam. Three broad political issues in particular have sustained this 
realignment.  
 
The first of these is the conjunctural response to a general crisis.  Algerian Islamism 
in the various expressions just outlined succeeded above all as protest movement 
capable of channelling multiple sources of popular discontent through a generic, and 
therefore broadly appealing grammar of ‘corruption’, ‘power’, ‘degradation’, ‘the 
people’ and so forth - as a political formation that was against the existing decadent 
order and promised moral and political regeneration. The content of such 
regeneration was once again, overwhelmingly generic and underspecified: it included 
the application of sharia law, the shift towards a ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ society, the 
jihad against corruption - all of which was neatly packaged in one of the preferred 
slogans of the Algerian FIS: ‘Islam is the solution’. 
 
The second arena of Islamist politics refers to the critique of political representation 
as constructed by the post-colonial state. Rampant corruption, ostentatious display of 
wealth, cynical manipulation of power and influence, and naked oppression have 
characterised much of the ruling classes’ political behaviour in the region during this 
period. The military regime’s obstinate monopoly of economic and political power, 
and its opaque campaign against armed Islamist insurgency after 1991 have severely 
dented any faith in representative politics as an expression of democracy. The 
rejection of democracy as concept ‘imported’ by ‘distant powers’, and its replacement 
by a ‘socially and culturally profound’ notion of shura which is ‘immediate’ and 
‘direct’, is all the more powerful when Islamists reduce secular post-colonial regimes 
to mere puppets of the former metropole. 
 
Finally, Algerian Islamism has captured the country’s anti-imperialist agenda and 
legacy by aligning it to a broader transnational Islamism. The dual emphasis on the 
inferiority and humiliation of the Arab-Muslim world on the one hand, and the 
possible alternative in the ‘path’ of Islamic civilisation on the other, echoes forms of 
Third World anti-imperialism which characterised the international relations of other 
Islamist movements across the globe. Algerian Islamists have in the past readily 
adopted the Iranian revolution’s slogan ‘Neither East nor West’ (la sharqui, la 
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gharbi) as a rallying point for their more internationally-minded sympathisers. Over 
the past two decades, however, the anti-imperialism of the jihadists has followed one 
of two paths. The first, exemplified by the AIS and GIA, explicitly continued in the 
mujahid tradition of the national liberation war and focused its attacks on the ‘French 
Party’ (hizb frança), both in France and Algeria. Despite their dieaological and 
tactical differences, these two armed groups integrated much of the ‘Algerianist’ 
(jaza’ira) tendency within its ranks (Hafez, 2000). A second more ‘internationalist’ 
approach to jihad was adopted from the late 1990s by the Salafi Group for Preaching 
and Combat and subsequently al Qaeda in the Maghreb. Here, the combination of 
personal networks among ‘Arab Afghans’ (often in exile), a southward shift in 
attention toward Mali and Niger and the 2006 affiliation of the Salafi Group to al 
Qaeda, produced an Algerian  jihadism that was trasnational in its composition, 
doctrine and actions (Filui, 2009).   
 
If ‘democracy’ is understood in Schumpeterian terms as a mere process involving 
transparently competitive elections among a plurality of political candidates who are 
able to freely express their programme and principles, then there is no question that 
the bulk of Algerian Islamist forces were perfectly compatible with democracy.  At its 
height in the early 1990s, the FIS plainly represented a significant section of Algerian 
political opinion and as such it mobilised and participated in successive electoral 
contests, in the main respecting due process, freedom of expression and the rule of 
law. Once we consider ‘democracy’ as a set of substantive rights (to personal 
autonomy, basic human needs, involving the separation of powers and so forth) then 
the Islamist attachment to democracy becomes more problematic. It is certainly the 
case – as elsewhere in the Muslim world – that Islamists offered welfare, health, 
education and legal support where the state failed to do so. Yet this ‘third sector’ 
provision was not premised on universalist assumptions of democracy, but has itself 
acted as a form of political patronage, attached to the particularistic religious-
ideological beliefs of Islamists. Similarly, the internal workings of the FIS and its 
successors were closer to the proclaimed  ‘Islamic’ alternative to democracy, 
‘shurikratiyya’: rule through consultation of (male) elders, clerics or notables rather 
than through a transparent and participatory process of internal democracy. The issue, 
then, as Asef Bayat has helpfully put it, is not whether is Islam is compatible with 
democracy (which it clearly can be), but rather ‘under what conditions can Muslims 
make them compatible’ (Bayat, 2007: 4).  The argument made in this paper is that the 
twin forces of a patrimonial state founded on hydrocarbons wealth and a post-colonial 
praetorian guard on the one hand, and a narrowly populist and ideologically 
involutionist form of political dissent, have mad it very difficult for Algerian Muslims 
to make democracy compatible with Islam. 
 
Of course, the core ideological components of Algerian Islamic political dissent have  
been  expressed in a wide variety of ways at different junctures over the past two 
decades - all of  which often complicates reference to a catch-all category like 
‘Islamism’. As we shall shortly see, on the accommodationist end of the spectrum,  
both the MSP and MNR leaderships have effectively been co-opted by the state, while 
the MNR has established tactical alliances with the staunchly secular (and Berberist)  
Rally for Culture and Democracy and the (Trotskyist) Workers’ Party. Such political 
professionalisation and ideological pragmatism has nonetheless generated some 
dissonance with their grassroots membership: ‘[w]hile the MSP and the MNR have 
succeeded politically by accepting co-optation, many of their supporters still vote for 
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them in protest at Western policies and state authoritarianism.’ (Boubekeur, 2007: 4). 
Similarly, on the extreme jihadist end of the continuum there is considerable evidence 
to suggest that these groups were so deeply infiltrated by the state’s secret services, 
that in some instances they simply acted as agents of those factions of ‘le pouvoir’ 
intent on ramping up a ‘strategy of tension’ (Yous, 2000). The one underlying theme 
in these diverse experiences, then, is the constant interaction between the state and 
forces of political dissent which produced complex dynamics of cooperation and 
convergence; of contestation, manipulation and accommodation; of convergence and 
fragmentation.  
 
Over the last decade these political tensions have in the main been resolved in favour 
of the state and its supporters within civil society. Crudely put, ‘le pouvoir’ has won 
the civil war, reducing the emergency of the 1990s to a series of politically and 
geographically marginal and - from the state’s perspective – manageable local 
insurgencies. Co-optation and reconciliation have replaced repression and 
counterinsurgency as the dominant responses to political dissent in Algeria. One 
individual, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has symbolised this successful switch in 
strategy, which we now explore in greater detail.  
 
Bouteflika’s Gambit 
The principal political objective of Algeria’s ruling elites since the failed pluralisation 
of 1988 has been securing social stability and political continuity. This should of 
course not be confused with the quest for democracy, accountability or increased 
socio-economic equality. The ‘normalisation’ or ‘pacification’ of Algerian politics 
through the 1990s was instead pursued through the age-old combination of ruthless 
violence and electoral legitimation. The parameters which structured this aim for 
stability and continuity are not clear-cut, and involve complex and often opaque 
struggles among and within various interconnected loci of socio-economic and 
political power in Algeria, including the Army High Command, diverse political 
parties and social movements, terrorist groups and assorted business interests. It is in 
this context that Abdelaziz Bouteflika returned to Algerian politics from a twenty-
year exile to win the presidential elections of April 1999 with an overwhelming 
majority of 73.9 percent of the vote (albeit from an unofficially estimated 23 per cent 
turn-out and after the withdrawal of six major opposition candidates in the face of 
widespread media bias and eventual rigging).  
 
Undeniably, Bouteflika’s electoral success seems implausible without the 
endorsement of Algeria’s General Staff.. It would be naïve to interpret his  ascent to 
power as the work of a lonely maverick. As one acute observer of Algerian politics 
commented at the time of the new President’s accession, ‘Bouteflika has a long way 
to go before he can claim to be commander in chief as well as in name’ (Roberts 
2003:  276). For Roberts, the vigorous reshuffle of the army leadership in February 
2000 ‘completed a take-over of the Algerian army by former officers of the French 
army at the expense of the last survivors of the maquis tradition’, which in turn 
suggested that ‘The army commanders may be counting on the development of strong 
ties to Western defence establishments to compensate them … for the loss traditional 
internal public support and legitimation as well as provide organisational models, 
training and hardware’ (Roberts 2003:  273-74). 
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There is a further, more structural difficulty in reading Boutelfika’s rise and 
permanence as corresponding to the power of any specific constituency with a 
discernible political strategy, and that is what Benjamin Stora has labelled ‘the 
invisible constructions’ of Algerian politics (Stora, 2001). Without falling blithely 
into Orientalist tropes of an unfathomable an exceptional ‘Other’, Stora nonetheless 
does draw our attention to the opacity, duplicity and paranoia that has characterised 
much of Algerian politics (or what some Algerians call la boulitique – roughly 
‘politicking’): ‘This deliberate opacity hinders our attempts at explanation, at eliciting 
some measure of solidarity from outside the country.  Like negoation, war unfolds 
within closed doors, in the shadows. The culture of secrecy, a working-mode of 
French political society, explains the veil thrown over this conflict.’ (Stora, 2001: 45).      
 
Bouteflika’s ‘two-pronged approach to the Algerian crisis’ according to Robert 
Mortimer, involved ‘a policy of amnesty towards the armed groups and a policy of 
projecting Algeria on to the world stage’ (Mortimer 2004: 185). On this reading, it is 
possible to discern a fraught and precarious, but viable alignment between the Army 
leadership’s objectives and those of the President as identified by Mortimer, where 
Bouteflika acted as the ‘public face’ of the Army’s wider strategy for domestic and 
international rehabilitation of Algeria in the eyes of world. The ‘professionalisation’ 
of the Army and the accompanying ‘civilianisation’ of the Presidency have, together 
with the reconstitution of the historic FLN as a party of government further re-
arranged the balance of power between military, executive and legislative authority in 
Algeria. 
 
Domestically, the centrepiece of Bouteflika’s successive presidencies was the process 
of national reconciliation aimed at closing the period of civil strife inaugurated in 
1992. A ‘Concorde Civile’ law approved by referendum in September 2000 offered 
different levels of amnesty for those rebels involved in the insurgency of the 1990s 
while a presidential amnesty was extended to the AIS. In the wake of his re-election 
in April 2004, Bouteflika launched a second phase of political normalisation through 
the Charter of National Reconciliation and Peace (once again approved by referendum 
in September 2005) which ‘was divided into four sections, designed to consolidate 
peace, consolidate national reconciliation, address the issue of the “disappeared” and 
solidify national cohesion’ (Joffé 2008: 219). Together, these successive exercises in 
reconciliation delivered what Ashour (2010) has identified as one successful, and one 
flawed process of  ‘de-radicalisation’. Among the former is the case of the FIS’s 
armed wing , the AIS, where a combination of economic inducements – securing 
employment or facilitating the start-up of small businesses for those who put down 
their guns - and a  comprehensive programme of state protection for former guerrillas 
secured the effective dismantling of the AIS as a paramilitary organisation after 2000. 
The unsuccessful case of de-radicalisation involves the GIA, which by 2005 had all 
but disappeared through a process of splintering and military ‘eradication’. Only a 
tiny fraction of the estimated 10,000 GIA militants of 1994 survive today as the al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Countries of the Maghreb. In Ashour’s estimation, 
‘Unsuccessful de-radicalization can be explained in the GIA’s case by the lack of 
charismatic leadership due to short term tenures, limited educational and theological 
backgrounds, excessively violent beahvior and virulent factionalization .’ (Ashour, 
2010: 131).   
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These political process aimed and neutralising and dismantling the jihadist wing of 
Algerian Islamism was subtly intertwined with Bouteflika’s economic policies, 
associated by Iván Martín to three ‘broad axes’: ‘[t]o continue with the already 
initiated “market reforms”, promoting the private sector’s role in the economy and 
creating a favourable environment for investments […] the reduction of  trade 
protection in Algerian markets’(Martín 2003: 41) as well as a range of ‘structural 
reforms’ in  public and judicial administration, education and, as we shall shortly see, 
in the hydrocarbons sector. Such reforms have been widely contested by, among other 
forces, the trades unions, and in many respects still remain unrealised. Similarly, it is 
far from clear that Bouteflika’s gambit of articulating national reconciliation with 
international prestige has yet paid off. ‘The high oil price and resulting buoyant 
revenue have given the “distributive state” in Algeria a new lease on life’ Hugh 
Roberts persuasively maintained in 2007. ‘As a result, the regime’s capacity to co-opt 
opposition and buy social peace is high and the effective pressure fundamental 
institutional reform is low’ (Roberts, 2007: 19). The reliance on the hydrocarbons 
sector to periodically inject the regime with a new lease of life is however a risky 
enterprise, for it is subject to both the vagaries of international commodity markets 
and the precariousness of domestic patrimonial-clientelist alliances and their 
accompanying de-radicalisation processes. The next section explores both these 
determinants in the so-called ‘Bouteflika effect’.   
 
The Role of Energy in the ‘Bouteflika Effect’ 
Algeria’s hydrocarbon sector was first developed on a serious commercial scale in the 
years after the Second World War. The opening decades of the twentieth century had 
witnessed generally unsuccessful oil explorations in the north of the country, and it 
was not until 1954 – the very same year the revolutionary war for national liberation 
was launched – that significant gas findings were confirmed in the Sahara, first in 
Djebel Berga and subsequently at the giant Hassi Messaoud oilfield (Aïssaoui 2001). 
Initially, and despite the intensification of the war, exploration and exploitation was 
conducted by private French companies supported by public authorities. The defeat of 
the French in 1962 saw the creation of the Algerian Societé Nationale de Transports 
et de Commercialisation des Hydrocarbons (SONATRACH) responsible not just for 
the research, development, exploration, transport and marketing of Algeria’s 
hydrocarbons resources but subsequently their downstream refinement, liquefaction 
and petrochemical transformation (Nelson 1985). Emboldened by the rise of OPEC 
and spurred on by Boumediene’s bourgeoning strategy of ‘industrialising industries’, 
the Algerian state took a 51 percent stake in SONATRACH in 1971 and effectively 
nationalised the country’s hydrocarbons sector.  
 
Since then SONATRACH has operated as a major arm of the state and a critical 
resource in Algeria’s external relations. During the first twenty years of its existence, 
the company adopted a ‘do-it-alone’ policy in line with the government’s 
revolutionary nationalist ideology, placing significant barriers on private and overseas 
investments in the country’s hydrocarbons sector, one consequence of which was an 
extraordinarily low density of exploration (Aïssaoui 2001). In the face of this under-
exploitation and the plummeting international oil and gas prices, the Chadli regime 
introduced a new Hydrocarbons Law in 1986, replacing the existing arrangements 
with legislation that authorised access of foreign capital to production-sharing 
contracts, joint ventures, joint-stock investments and risk service contracts with 
SONATRACH. The national company still retained 51 percent participation in 
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national oil, restricted foreign access to gas and limited joint ventures to fields 
discovered after 1986. But a protracted process of what during the 1990s became 
known as ‘capital opening’ was now underway. In 1991 fresh amendments to the 
1986 Hydrocarbons Law opened a new gas and oil strategy which according to one 
expert revolved around ‘three policy directions: first increasing the hydrocarbons 
resource and production through a boost in E&D efforts; secondly, enhancing the oil 
recovery of existing fields within a re-development programme; thirdly, bringing on 
stream all discovered, but not yet developed, gas fields’ (Aïssaoui 2001: 101). This in 
turn facilitated the award between 1987 to 2000 of 45 production-sharing exploration 
contracts with 27 companies from 20 different countries (Aïssaoui 2001: 101). It is 
with this background that we can begin to identify the main contours of the 
‘Bouteflika effect’ as it unfolded in the wake of the former foreign minister’s first 
electoral victory in April 1999. 
 
Two fairly contingent and largely exogenous political and economic developments 
have shaped the tight connections between Algeria’s foreign and domestic politics. 
The first is the sharp and sustained rise in oil and gas prices over the last decade. The 
second was the launch of a ‘war on terror’ after 9/11. Bouteflika demonstrated great 
skill in turning these global events to his country’s advantage. Specifically, 
Bouteflika’s three terms in Office have seen an attempt at the complex conjugation of 
(a) the diversification and intensification of Algeria’s external relations, accompanied 
by (b) the diplomatic rapprochement with Paris and Washington which in turn has 
fostered (c) the process of domestic political ‘normalisation’ aimed at (d) 
transforming Algeria into a ‘pivotal state’ of the world market and global geopolitics 
(Zoubir 2004). Once again, the country’s energy sector has been central to this 
strategy.  
 
Three major diplomatic events in as many years reflect the reinvigoration of Algeria’s 
foreign policy under Bouteflika. Algiers hosted the 35
th
 Summit of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) in July 1999, thereby reopening an era of pan-African and 
Third Wordlist activism on the part of Algeriawhich, as Boumedienne’s foreign 
minister, Bouteflika himself had embodied in the 1970s. While holding the OAU 
Presidency for one year, Bouteflika brokered the December 2000 ceasefire between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, mediated between conflicting parties in the Great Lakes region, 
launched  -with South Africa and Nigeria – the New Partnership for African 
development (NEPAD) and represented African interests at the Kananaskis G-8 
Summit and at other international fora a dealing with the continent’s debt burden. 
Most tellingly, under Bouteflika Algeria has intensified diplomatic and strategic links 
with Nigeria, among other initiatives opening negotiations for the future construction 
of an Nigeria-Algeria Gasline (Nigal) (Clarke 2008, Mortimer, 2006; Zoubir 2004).   
 
Twelve months after the OAU summit, Bouteflika flew to Paris for the first ever full 
state visit of an Algerian President.
1
 These were subsequently reciprocated by the 
French President and, while the benefit of hindsight suggests such exchanges were of 
more symbolic than substantive value, most informed accounts of the visit recognise 
the kernel of truth in Bouteflika’s diplomatic rhetoric on leaving France in the 
summer of 2000 (with a small reduction of its debt burden to France, a promise of 
                                                 
1
 As the ever meticulous Hugh Roberts indicates, the 1983 visit by Chedli was an ‘official’ visit 
(Roberts, 2003) 
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investment from the French business class and some equestrian gear allegedly 
belonging to the Emir Abdelkader): ‘Algeria seeks to have an exceptional, not simply 
normal or trivial, relations with France’ (cited in Zoubir 2004).  
 
These same observers note that Algeria’s diplomatic normalisation with France served 
as the prelude to a rapprochement the rest of the European Union. In December 2001 
– after a five-year delay caused by Algeria’s civil war - Algiers signed an Association 
Agreement with Brussels. This brought both political dividends for Algeria (in the 
dedication of a specific chapter to terrorism in the Agreement) and economic benefits 
in the form of greater European investment in the country. But it is the two pipelines 
delivering Saharan gas to the Iberian and Italian peninsulas (Medgaz and Galis 
respectively) that have ‘locked in’ southern Europe’s energy security to Algeria’s key 
role as natural gas supplier (Darbouche 2008). This is, to be sure, not a foregone 
conclusion as Libyan competition and Europe’s own attempts at diversification of 
supply can modify the terms of such interdependence. But as one specialist has 
succinctly noted:  ‘In the long term, Algeria’s gas market is dependent on the 
European economy and the direction of environmental pressures, currently running in 
its favour’ (Clarke 2008: 235). 
 
The frantic shift from relative isolation to multilateral engagement in Algeria’s 
foreign relations culminated in July 2001 with Bouteflika’s two-day visit to 
Washington. As in previous high-profile visits to western capitals, this gathering bore 
mixed fruits for Algiers. On the one hand, investment and trade accords reinforced 
American capital’s position as largest foreign direct investor in Algeria with US$5 
billion worth of assets in the Algerian economy (principally the hydrocarbons sector). 
On the other hand, American business made it clear at this and subsequent bilateral 
gatherings that such figures reflected half of the potential investment should Algeria 
deliver improvements in security, infrastructure and legislation favourable to foreign 
investors. The 9/11 attacks paradoxically (some might argue, cynically) worked in 
Bouteflika’s favour as his officials were now able to make a strong case for the 
connections between George W. Bush’s ‘global war on terror’ and Algeria’s ten year 
counterinsurgency against domestic terrorism. Successive visits to Washington in 
November 2001 and July 2003 cemented this counter-terrorist partnership, as did 
Algiers’ closer relations with NATO. Algeria is currently one of a handful of African 
states engaged in AFRICOM’s Joint Combined Exchange Training (‘Flintlock’) 
exercises, and a signal member of the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership. 
Algiers authorised the use of its Tamanrasset airfield in the deployment of American 
P-2 ‘Orion’ aerial surveillance and a subsidiary of Halliburton, Brown and Root-
Condor is reportedly partner to a joint venture with SONATARACH for the extension 
of the Tamanrasset and Bou Saada military air bases (Volman 2007). 
 
The overall strategy informing this rush of diplomatic activity has been neatly 
summarised by Yahia Zoubir: ‘A close analysis of Bouteflika’s pronouncements 
highlight[s] two intertwined objectives, both of which had a direct linkage to foreign 
policy: restoration of civil peace and economic recovery’ (Zoubir 2004: 164). The 
great challenge for Bouteflika and his supporters has been to reconcile these two 
objectives, for without the restoration of peace there will be no recovery; yet the 
chosen path of recovery (a deeper integration into the world market) can still upset the 
restoration of civil peace.  
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Algeria is actively courting foreign investment in a bid to find employment for its 
youthful and educated working population, as well as upgrading the country’s 
economic infrastructure. Bouteflika’s diplomatic campaigns have been geared at 
marketing Algeria as a stable and resourceful ‘emerging market’ full of lucrative 
potential for those firms willing to bet on country’s future. And the hydrocarbons 
sector has been at the forefront of this process of rebranding. Algeria’s full 
hydrocarbons potential is elusive, although its natural gas reserves were estimated at 
the start of 2008 to be the ninth in the world, with 2.6 per cent of global reserves 
(‘Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production’ 2007). On some calculations ‘Only 
15% of Algeria’s 1.5 million sq km of prospective sedimentary area has been 
explored to date’ (Clarke 2008: 239). Vast areas of the western Sahara and the Atlas 
mountains still remain untapped, and SONATRACH is intent on significantly 
increasing both oil and gas production (in process re-balancing its output in the 
direction of oil). The ‘go-it-alone’ policy of the 1970s and early 80s has gradually 
been replaced by a regime much more accommodating of foreign investors, with 25 
international companies today operating in Algeria’s hydrocarbon sector. Yet 
SONTRACH still remains in firm control of Algerian hydrocarbon resources, and 
recent international bidding rounds have been extremely selective and in some cases, 
dismissive of foreign partners and players (most notoriously in excluding Spain’s 
Repsol-YPF and Gas Natural from the Gassi Touil LNG venture).  
 
The internationalisation of Algerian hydrocarbons has, however, not flowed in one 
direction only. SONATRACH is becoming a player in the global oil and gas sector 
through its portfolio of upstream and downstream investments. It holds 40 percent 
equity in a recently discovered Yemeni block, 15 percent interest in Anadarko and 5 
percent in Duke Energy and has recently ‘focused on expanding its upstream activities 
in the Middle East and Africa, petrochemicals entry into Spain with German partner 
BASF, oil trading in London and Singapore, and LNG trading in Amsterdam’ (Clarke 
2008: 238). Similar ventures are forecast in Iraq, Chad and Angola. In sum, 
SONATRACH is still living up to its role as the government’s most powerful weapon 
of economic statecraft, both domestically and internationally.  
 
There is an intrinsic risk to hedging a country’s economic recovery on international 
commodity markets like those of oil and gas. This is especially so for a country like 
Algeria where a full 90 percent of foreign earnings stem from gas. Still, the record 
price increases of the last decade allowed Algeria to reverse its current account deficit 
and it now holds an estimated US$ 110 billion foreign exchange surplus – over 50 
percent of its GDP. Much of this is being reinvested through public expenditure, 
ostensibly to secure future economic growth and drastically reduce the country’s high 
unemployment (still officially at 14 per cent) - all of which indicates a sharp 
sensitivity to the perils of an economic and political dependency on hydrocarbon 
rents. For our purposes, the two arenas where such patrimonial redistribution has 
proven especially relevant are with regard to the co-optation strategy and the factional 
instrumentalisation of hydrocarbon revenues. 
 
Miriam R. Lowi has documented how the initial ‘eradicationist’ strategy of repression 
which came to dominate the state’s response to insurgency in the 1990s gave way by 
the turn of the new century to co-optation and manipulation of the opposition (Lowi, 
2009). As we saw earlier with regard to de-radicalisation, the regime proved 
especially adept at exploiting the progressive fragmentation of the Islamist opposition, 
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playing the personality cult of various insurgent ‘emirs’ against each other and 
undertaking selective negotiations with, and eventual agreements with different 
rebellious factions. It is estimated that shortly before his re-election in 2004, 
Bouteflika distributed ‘on average, the equivalent of $50-60 million to every wilaya 
[administrative province] he visited’ (Lowi, 2009: 141). This, combined with the 
emphasis on the country’s new-found diplomatic prestige (an elusive but very 
valuable property given Algeria’s signal role in post-colonial Pan-Africanism and the 
campaign for a New International Economic Order) furnished Bouteflika and his 
supporters with a powerful ideological narrative of national unity and reconciliation. 
 
Yet Bouteflika’s ascendancy has, predictably enough, not gone uncontested – and not 
just from the ‘usual suspects’ among civil society. At the start of 2010, the complex 
edifice of the Algerian state was rocked by a series of scandals, high-level sackings 
and the assassination of a police chief, which have shaken the foundations of 
Bouteflika’s regime. Four Bouteflika allies at the helm of SONATRACH were 
dismissed from their posts over alleged corruption relating to international 
procurement contracts. The investigation was led by country’s top intelligence and 
security agency, the Département du Reseignement et de la Sécurité, (DRS) – a  
bastion of the ‘deep state’, and then followed by the assassination under suspicious 
circumstances of Ali Tounsi, the chief of another law enforcement agency, politically 
closer to the President’s office. The upshot of all this intrigue, according to John P. 
Entelis is ‘[a]n Algerian political economy strategy increasingly in the hands of 
resource nationalists with the critical support of le pouvoir, in which control of 
Sonatrach is essential’ (Entelis, 2011: 671). This in turn may well complicate or even 
reverse Boutelfika’s two-pronged strategy of external rehabilitation and domestic 
reconciliation. 
 
Bouteflika’s gambit, then, has not rested solely on this awareness of the potential 
contagion of the ‘Dutch disease’. It is also, and fundamentally premised on the 
assumption that Algeria’s domestic recovery is deeply reliant on ending its 
international isolation. The closure of the twenty years’ crisis in Algeria lies, for 
Bouteflika and his supporters, in reinstating Algeria’s international diplomatic and 
economic stature in world affairs. The benefits of such a policy for many of the 35 
million Algerians is not immediately palpable, beyond the rhetorical power of 
restoring this nation’s past dignity and prestige. The political and economic price of 
Bouteflika’s gambit is likely to be high among public sector workers, secular 
defenders of the regime and among the many millions that may not see the direct 
benefits of foreign investment, international prestige and political normalisation in 
terms of employment, housing, inflation or general standard of living. Yet, because 
the other possible alternative – a return to the political turmoil and socio-economic 
involution of the 1990s – is currently unacceptable to most Algerians, it is also likely 
that the ‘Bouteflika effect’ may well succeed in delivering the stability and continuity 
that has eluded Algeria since Boumedienne’s demise in 1978. Here the historical 
memory of the war of national liberation and the more recent civil war generally plays 
in favour of the President’s strategy of normalisation. Some have rightly pointed out, 
‘[h]ow experiences of colonial repression are understood within a deeper historical 
context … which maintains a power and potency for past incidents of such repression 
beyond the state’s official narrative of these events’ (Githens-Mazer, 2009). But the 
evidence thus far suggests that Bouteflika ‘narrative’ is gaining legitimacy while the 
counter-discourse of  ‘Islam is the Solution’ no longer acts as a mobilising force. 
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Some Concluding Reflections 
There is a certain circular quality to the experience of Islam and political dissent in 
contemporary Algeria. After twenty years of crisis, the country is still run by a narrow 
military-bureaucratic oligarchy which has staked its survival on the distribution of 
hydrocarbon wealth to curry political favour from supporters and contenders alike. 
Despite the ripple effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ across that part of the world, the 
Algerian regime thus far seems to have snuffed out local expressions of the regional 
revolts, not least through the support proffered by its European and American allies. 
In Lise Storm’s blunt but accurate rendition, ‘The reason why the democratic 
opposition is so weak can be summed up in one word: repression.’ (Storm, 2009) It 
was under very similar circumstances –albeit with the locus of revolutionary change 
in the Soviet bloc - that Chadli Benjedid opened a process of political reform which 
was to mark his own demise, the rise of Islamism and the subsequent ten-year civil 
war. The crucial difference between the current conjuncture and that of the early 
1990s is that, in Algeria at least, it is Islamism that is in political decline while ‘le 
pouvoir’ has reasserted its hegemony.  
 
There are two basic reasons why Algeria’s twenty-year crisis has come full-circle. 
The first of these, as we have seen, is the defeat of the Islamist insurgency and the 
accompanying success of co-option strategies. Islamist insurgents have been 
geographically contained to the mountainous hinterlands of the country. Perhaps more 
importantly, jihadists have been politically marginalised by their self-proclaimed 
association with al Qaeda, a network that has never had popular backing in Algeria or 
indeed elsewhere across the Muslim world.  In contrast, the regime has managed to 
incorporate aspects of the Islamist programme and some of its ‘accommodationist’ 
personnel into the bricolage of the regime itself. In this regard, one of the legacies of 
Islamist populism of the 1990s has been the recycling by Bouteflika’s regime of some 
of the dissident discourse of that decade, particularly surrounding ‘national 
resurgence’ and ‘moral regeneration’. Ironically, the appropriation by the FIS of the 
historical FLN’s nationalist mantle in the 1990s has now been inverted with the re-
incorporation of populist components from the FIS into the re-launched FLN. As the 
foreign minister under the nationalist ‘golden age’ of Boumediene, Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika literally embodies the ‘retro’ turn to the 1970s, almost acting as an 
amnesiac for the ‘lost decades’ of the 1980s and 90s.  
 
The second factor behind the reassertion of state power over dissident movements in 
Algeria has been the regime’s successful manipulation of hydrocarbon wealth for the 
purpose of acquiring legitimacy. Here, it is the core of the state apparatus itself that 
has taken on a populist turn, mobilising the nation’s natural resources not simply for 
economic redistribution at home, but also for the purposes of diplomatic rehabilitation 
abroad. In Lowi’s apt summary, ‘It is through the selective distribution of rent and 
other material favors that loyalties are bought, alliances are cemented, and networks 
are greased. Similarly, the withholding of material favors is itself a powerful means of 
destroying alliances and networks.’ (Lowi, 2009: 179). True, the ‘populism’ on 
display in Bouteflika’s Algeria is no longer of a revolutionary type – one seeking to 
radically transform social relations ‘from above’. It is rather a patrimonial/clientelist 
sort of populism that invokes many of the nationalist tropes of ‘unity’ and 
‘resurgence’, but in fact (re)distributes wealth and privileges in a politically selective 
and instrumental fashion.  
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As his paper has argued, the return to a clientelist populism has broadly achieved its 
aims of securing social stability and regime continuity. The coercive strategies of the 
1990s have slowly been replaced by the co-optive tactics of the new century, as the 
combination of socio-economic and political incentives and the disincentive of 
returning to civil war have fragmented the Islamist opposition and integrated much of 
it into the regime’s political machinery. I hope in the final version of this paper to 
explore some of the comparative dimensions of this experience, as there are plainly 
some points of convergence with other Muslim-majority polities considered in the 
project – perhaps most notably Indonesia and Egypt. Both share with Algeria a 
fraught  history of anti-colonial revolutions which delivered military rule by a single, 
mass radical-nationalist political movement. Indonesia comes closer to Algeria in 
terms of its dependence on geological wealth, whilst Algerian Islamism is perhaps 
more proximate ideologically and sociologically to the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood. Still, there are plenty of particularities to the Algerian experience, which 
I aim to draw out - not least a trajectory of regime liberalisation, civil war and regime 
restoration which is arguably unique among the countries covered in the project, and 
itself reflective of a very specific relationship between Islam and political dissent.      
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